For much of the world, Putin’s war with Ukraine started with Russian troops attacking from all directions on February 24th, 2022. However, for Ukraine, this war began in 2014 when Putin captured Crimea and orchestrated the hybrid war in Donbas. Although much of that is public available, many of the details and their implications for the ongoing conflict remain unknown to general public.
denkfabrik spoke with Andrey Zakharov, an investigative journalist from Russia and the author of a documentary on Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In an interview Andrey tells his view on the roots of the conflict, Russian journalism both under censorship and in exile, and Putin’s influence in the West during elections.
How would you introduce yourself to an audience that does not know you well?
I’m an investigative reporter who made investigations about Prigozhin, about his trolls’ factory, about Putin and his secret family.
You started your career as a scholar in the history of arts but transitioned to investigative journalism. What for?
The work of historian and the work of, of a journalist I think they have a lot in common. Because you, you have to find sources, you have to restore something that happened in the past.
My PhD thesis about Soviet culture was almost ready. Then I said to my professor that I will bring it to him in three months. And I saw him just five years after that. It was too boring. But now working as an investigative reporter, you start to investigate something and then you restore this piece of reality. Your picture’s just only 30%, but it’s enough for the audience. Now in my work, I use those skills which I received as a historian.
What was your point of shooting a documentary about War in Ukraine in 2014 after the full-scale has already happened?
When you’re an investigative reporter, sometimes can come back to things that happened even 20 years ago and just, You know, when you find out something new and which people, the thing which people didn’t know before, and you think that it will open eyes to what happened 20 years ago, 10 years ago. We thought that our audience will be basically Russian for those Russians who are anti-war, but they don’t know what happened at that time.
So they have like, you know, they will have an instruction how to discuss these things with their relatives. And for those who are in doubt, for example, again, Russians. But when it was released and we received reviews from the Western audience, we understood that it is also important for the Western audience.
Not only the Russians woke up in the morning on the 24th and understood that Putin started some war, but people in the West, they don’t know how it happened. So the idea was to put on the table those evidences, those facts, which you can touch, which you can check yourself. There are a lot of books written by Russian separatists, Russian activists who were deeply involved in what happened in 2014, where they’re saying the truth that it was Russia behind this war, because you know, when you write a book, you have to be honest because it’s a book. It’s difficult to lie in a big book. And because for them, there’s nothing better than that.
Because for them, the West tried to conquer Russia. And so this is the reason why this war started in Ukraine. It is a battlefield, between Russia and the West. And there’s nothing bad that Russia was behind this war, and even more, Russia should have been deeply involved in that, and something like that.
This is the reason why they do not lie why they’re saying the truth in these books. So the idea was to collect all these evidences, to put them in a timeline for Russians, for those who are in doubt. And then we understood that even for the West audience and for Ukrainians too, by the way, by the time we were talking, it was watched by 3.5 million people. And 10 percent of them are from Ukraine. Sure, partially from the occupied territories and I received messages from people who live in the Crimea, the annexed Crimea, like “we didn’t know that, thank you very much”. But I think that inside this 10%, there are even people who live in Ukraine, which is successfully, not occupied. And maybe for them, it was interesting.
What did you discover for yourself while working on the movie?
The most striking thing for me is that In Russia, you can go to a bookstore and buy a book where it is said, Russia started this war in 2014. In Russia, people can be fined, can be arrested for just calling what is happening the war. Then you go to a bookstore and find these books where they, they’re putting a lot of secrets, in fact, secrets.
Like, I don’t know, a meeting in Rostov this is a city on the south of Russia, close to the border. Several weeks before Russian squad crossed the border, and this is how the war, in fact, started. One friend he wrote me, like, saying that I’m a total enemy now after this film. I said, okay, I’m a total enemy, but just, just explain to me where, where is what is not truth?
And he said, “Yeah, without us, it couldn’t have happened, but…” Another half is that, the West is trying to, to beat Russia, to conquer Russia, and other stuff. I mean, they don’t hide. they agree that without support from Russia, without Russian help, it wouldn’t have happened.
So I think this is the most striking thing for me. The fact that they are saying openly. One of the Donetsk commanders, Khodakovsky, he gave an interview about what happened the end of August, 2014: “Well, at that time we all hid it. We had, we had to hide it, but no, now, yeah, Russians came from Russia and helped us without them. We couldn’t beat Ukrainians”. For them there’s nothing to hide here because it is good that Russia helped. We have more and more evidence like that. This is great, I think.
Putin always denies responsibility for setting up War in Donbas in 2014. Which evidence proves the opposite?
When the war starts, when every war starts and the more victims we have, the more crime you see from both sides. It is unfortunately normal for the war. But you always have to understand who was at the beginning.
In his narrative, he’s very tricky because he begins to say, okay, children were killed, on both sides. Oh, you should remember how People were burned in Odessa in May, 2014. Yes. But a man, a group of people who started it, they are guilty of it.
So, the idea was to understand who was guilty. Who started it? And so when you put all this evidence together, you see that it was Russia and particularly Putin behind all of these things from the beginning. Almost on every step, it was Putin who started the next level of escalation.
For example, by the end of March, we see that protests on the southeast of Ukraine, they went down and even the Kremlin admits that people were not interested in these protests. It looked like Ukraine would live in peace. Then they help this squad to cross the border and Ukraine answered with the army to this act of aggression.
And this is how the war started. So Putin was behind this step. Then this pro Russian republics had big problems. And again, Russia helps with the real forces. Again, Putin’s He’s behind this escalation. So showing that he’s behind every step of escalation, showing that he is behind the first step when this squad crossed the border, we can say his war because he started this war.
The same question pro-war people in Russia and pro-Russian activists in Ukraine asking themselves for nine years already. Because he had an official agreement from the Russian parliament to use army in Ukraine. And it looked like it was going to do it. And we see it from other evidences that at least some signals were sent to pro-Russian actors in Ukraine at that time, at the beginning of March, that the Russian army will cross the border soon.
And you will see the same like in the Crimea. Putin admits it, that the only reason why he managed to, to annex the Crimea is because there was Russian army there and the Russian army was behind pro-Russian activists. So it looked like he was going or he was ready to give a command “Go!” In one book written by ex Donetsk People’s Republic minister of state security, I mean, you can’t find somebody more pro-Russian here we, we found some answers to this question that the Kremlin didn’t dare to do it at the time. Because sociology show them that people in Russia wouldn’t support it. People in Ukraine wouldn’t support it. It looks like he agreed to start a hybrid war or at least just to, to let this squad with 50 Ukrainian and Russian veterans to cross the border.
Maybe he didn’t think that Ukrainians will stop, will answer them. Maybe he thought that it would be like in the Crimea where Ukrainian army left. This is the explanation which was given by a pro-Russian guy, right, former Donetsk People’s Republic minister. Russia was not ready for open, full scale invasion at that time, although separatists think that Russia should have done it.
In the movie you dedicate little screen time to the actions of the West in Ukraine in 2014. Why?
There are several reasons why there are so few mentions of the Western support of Ukraine, which we really saw in 2013 and 2014. For a long time, Ukraine was a battlefield of this, diplomatic battle between Russia and the West.
Pro-Western President Yushchenko, then he was changed with pro-Russian President Yanukovych. Before Yushchenko, there was another president Kuchma, was like, for some time he was closer to Russia, then he was closer to the West. So it was a political process inside Ukraine. One part of Ukraine was pro Russian, and the other was pro Western. Then in the center we have a mixture, and it is a question of policy, of political discussion.
And sure Russia tried to influence what’s happening in Ukraine, and the West tried to influence what’s happening in Ukraine, But then Putin came and started the war. Without him, it wouldn’t have happened, never.
There should be tanks, guns, and somebody should send them from Russia. Without them, there wouldn’t have been war. Because of storytelling, we need to focus on just one part of the story. If you want, to reach wider audience, you have to choose the most important things and to focus on one thing. Otherwise, it would be like, 10 hours or five movies.
So this is the reason why we just mentioned it. For example, when we talk about the second Ukrainian revolution we just mentioned that the war supported it. We was helped in the war and just the NGOs that received money from the West. But again, if Putin didn’t interfere into Ukraine with tanks and guns, there wouldn’t have been war.
Do you think that your movie can change minds of the war supporters in Russia?
Well, I’m not so naive that they can change people. You can put all evidences on the table and a man on the other side will say, okay, but the West tried to conquer us, you know, that, and there is no, there is no space for discussion here. You just go, oh, okay.
But there is a small group of people who are in doubt, who are critical. For example, they didn’t follow this awareness and they emotionally, mentally, they’re against the war. They don’t want the war. They don’t know how it happened and they need facts. When I published it and I asked people on the social media that if you have an example when your relative or your friend who was in doubt and he watched, she watched this movie and wrote, “Oh, now I think that. it was Putin behind the war”- if there is such an example, write me. And there are several examples.
One girl wrote me, oh, you helped me to start some process, processes in my father’s mind. He watched the movie and he started to look at it critically. Another example a woman from her mother lives in the Crimea and she sent her the link and the mother watched the movie and wrote: “Oh, I didn’t know that at all. How, how he dared to do it.” Meaning Putin. This is great.
But sure, I don’t have, an illusion in the style of the 18th century of the enlightenment time, right? When you think, okay, now we’ll educate people and they’ll totally change. No, sure. Because ideology is much more difficult process. Sometimes combined with unconscious processes.
But this video will be on the YouTube. Maybe in one year or in two years, those who are pro-war now and who say “you are an enemy”, meaning me, but maybe in two years they will say, “oh, I watched this video”. They’ll watch it and they’ll say, “ah, this is how it happened. Now I understand”. And then I will be very happy, but I don’t have an illusion that all Russians will watch this video and change their mind. So, no illusions.
People in Russia often say all news today is propaganda: be it from Russia or from the West. How do you approach them?
It’s difficult to discuss with such people, because again, this is a kind of psychological wall. A person defends himself from any negative information that can throw him away from this comfort zone. And then you come. and say “no, no, no, I will kick you off from your comfort zone. I will say, no, this is not propaganda. And this is propaganda”.
So, I’m not sure that even dictionaries that these people trust even dictionaries. You, you follow some narrative, you put something in a headline, then you put something in the leading sentence, then you put some narrative and then this narrative, even if you’re trying to be as objective as you can, but it doesn’t matter anyway, you put some narrative and there is some idea and you show your, your, your attitude.
I was thinking about it for a long time. Like, maybe, I should have done it in a different way. Several films, only facts without interpretation, but from storytelling point of view, and I think where a few people would watch some such movie. This is always, you know, you have to measure what you want, what audience you want to reach and what goals you want to reach.
If your goal is to make a dictionary, you try to make a dictionary. But the problem is that maybe in the end you will not make a dictionary, because still there will be a headline in which you will show everything.
How Putin manages to control public sentiment in Russia?
Well, first key controls. Most popular media, the TV, which is popular among elder audience. He partially controls the internet blocking independent resources and social media because the Instagram is officially declared an extremist organization in Russia. When you control. this space, you control the narrative He doesn’t control telegram or YouTube, but still.
Another thing is that Russia and Russians, we are very afraid of the state or the power. The majority is always pro government. This is a comfort zone for most people because of this historical tradition because it’s so dangerous. To be against the state, you’re not only against Putin and his circle. It looks like you are against the majority.
From our childhood we all know that it’s comfortable to be the majority and dangerous to be with the minority. And so in this case, it’s very easy to control the narrative. So maybe people somewhere inside themselves, they think that the war is bad. Unconsciously. But then they use this narrative, which Putin is spreading just because they choose the easiest way. This is not a kind of, you know cynicism. People do believe in it.
So first he controls the media narrative, and then he is a man with the power. And from our childhood, we know that we should follow a man or a woman with the power, a teacher, a father, a mother, it doesn’t matter. They know what we want. This is what they say in Russia: “We know better what you want. We know better what you, you should do”. And when I have millions and millions of people who grew up in this. conditions, you have what we have in Russia, unfortunately.
How effective are Putin’s media abroad?
Sure, Putin, Prigozhin before, Putin through Prigozhin, tried to influence the Western media and government. They use social media to spread the, his, this narrative.
But again – I will explain to you what I mean – this is again, some kind of 18th century strategy. When you think that people either follow Putin’s narrative, or they just follow some pieces of this, like traditional values. So now we should stop Russian propaganda, and then people will say, “Oh, okay. Okay. Yeah. No, traditional, values: we support LGBT”. No, this is much more complicated.
For example, I live in Bulgaria and Russophilia was always a part of, culture and inner politics in Bulgaria since 19th century. But now, the local politics are saying, “Okay, there’s a lot of Russian propaganda. We should stop it. And Bulgarians will stop support Putin”. Because at the moment, officially this is the EU country at the first place with the biggest number of Putin supporters.
But I don’t see Russian propaganda. People like this narrative because they like this narrative. Orban is popular in Hungary, not because of Russia propaganda, Vucic is popular in Serbia not because of Russian propaganda. I mean, in Slovakia there is a new leader not because of the Russian propaganda or in the Netherlands.
And this is the problem of all liberals all the world. Because first of all, they think, “okay, this is Russian propaganda – we should stop it and people will stop support this narrative”. Then second, they don’t take it seriously.
Last year, there was research made by one American institute. They took all tweets written by Russian trolls, because they are public now, because Twitter published them. So they took all these tweets, and they saw that the audience of these tweets, written by Russian trolls, was pro-Trump already. Core pro-Trump. So they didn’t change their mind, they still were pro-Trump.
I think you should think why they support Trump. Why they support this narrative. Why this conservative narrative is starting to be more popular.
Maybe it means that there’s something in this narrative that people like. Maybe you should change your narrative and your attitude to this narrative. It’s quite normal to react with “ha-ha, those crazy traditionalists”, right?
I think this is a bad way to treat this part of people and it’s a big mistake. And treating this narrative as, “okay, they are influenced by Russia propaganda” – is a big mistake.
What can anti-war Russians do from abroad?
The first mission is to support those who are against the war. This is up to 30 million people, I think. Which is not the audience or the independent media, because some people don’t watch and read independent media for some reasons. Because they’re blocked because they want to their private life without any news because they’re tired of them because they’re afraid of all this news, it doesn’t matter.
We should deliver them news as journalists, talk to them. And say that you’re not alone. This is very important for them.
I receive a lot of messages from anti-war Russians from Russia saying, “when I watch what they’re doing, what you’re speaking on live streams or your investigations, you are speaking instead of me. This is you speaking, I cannot speak. I’m here in the kitchen in Moscow, I cannot speak, I’m afraid that my neighbor will say to the police that I’m again in the war, but watching you, you are saying what I want to say that I cannot say”. This is very important for them from the emotional point of view.
And the second goal, the second mission is to reach those who are in doubt. Maybe their husband is at war, and they want him to come back, but they cannot influence that. Or for example, the relative was killed in the war and then he can come to us. And read another and watch another version of reality.
And I think this is the only thing we can do now because it’s very dangerous to protest all partisan activities, like, I don’t know, they were dangerous too. And me sitting here in Europe, I cannot say go and protest. to support them and to work with those who are in doubt when they want to talk to us. I don’t have, again, an illusion that I can reach audiences. pro Putin now, I don’t have such illusion, but touching regional problems, because there are a lot of problems in regions. Touching these problems and economic problems, social problems, you can reach wider audiences as journalists. And this is, this is, these are things which we can do.
What is the future of the Russian media?
One American university invited me just for three weeks to visit them for short fellowship and to visit some lectures. And I was thinking like, okay, I’ll go there and I will hear how journalism should be in a normal situation, right? Media management, new formats, Instagram stories.
Okay, how it can implement them, right? Instagram is blocked. Any financial support is very restricted because transit between Russia and other countries they were difficult to be done because of sanctions. Then people are scared to donate your money because you’re a foreign agent. So, I mean, we live in an abnormal situation. We work in abnormal situation.
For example, Medusa, the leading independent media with the audience, at least 15 million, millions of people per month. Not even before the war, before they were declared as foreign agent, this is a kind of oppression in Russia. At least 50 percent of the money they spend, they earn them on advertising, on donations and that. But now there is no advertising because they’re undesired organization, which means that if you give a comment to them, you can be fined. If you work for Medusa, you can be put into jail.
This has been a big problem. Most independent media in exile are around 80 percent dependent on funding from NGOs from the U.S. and European countries. This is very bad. And 20 percent of money they get from donations, but people in Russia cannot donate to them — maybe it’s prohibited or it’s difficult. So, these are basically Russians abroad. And this is a big problem, and the situation will become even worse.
As for media in Russia: yeah, they work in a kind of, you know, more normal situation under censorship, but are still doing a very important job.
When there is state media, they will write about a hole in the road only when the local government allows them to speak about the hole in the road. But private media in regions, under censorship and with local governments trying to influence them, still write about a hole in the road without permission. Something more serious, like an investigation about the governor, maybe isn’t possible, but still, their job is very important.
Their financial situation is much more classical. I mean, they receive state funding, which is very bad too, because in Russia, most media receive state funding, particularly in regions, and this is the way to influence them. And then there’s advertising too. And again, this is normal for companies who pay for advertising. They think if we have advertising in the media, you will not write bad things about us.
So, if you speak about media in Russia who work under censorship, at the same time, it’s easier for them to survive in this situation than for independent media. I don’t know what will happen to them in several years when, for example, we still have Putin, we still have war, and the interest of funding organizations goes down.
Do you think that all media inside of Russia are forced into Putin’s narrative due to censorship?
Putin is everywhere in Russia. I mean, people continue their lives. People continue their private lives, and they need the media to write about a hole in the road.
And I give lectures to journalists in regions, and every lecture starts with a five-minute talk on how important their work is, from my point of view. And after that, they all begin to thank me, saying “Oh, thank you”. Because they’re frustrated, thinking that those who had to leave Russia and who speak openly think they are, you know, bad journalists. Because they work under censorship and they feel, you know, guilty about that.
They are important for local people who are against the war. Moreover, I would say that what’s also important is: the MP from the ruling party will not give money to fix this hole, but this independent MP will give money to fix this hole. And this is very important for people.
I think that there will be such kind of politics in Russia. And these independent MPs who will not go into, you know, political narrative. They will stay inside this local narrative. Just think locally and don’t think globally, right? Just only think locally. But when the time to think globally comes again, it will be them who are the foundation of new independent Russian politics.
These people are very important, and they are very important for anti-war Russians. Because people there feel like “Politicians left us. Journalists left us. And we are alone here with this fucking Putin, you know”. It’s so important for them to feel that they’re not alone.
So, I don’t think that they support Putin’s narrative. I think that they’re doing a small but very important job, which, you know, I think even opposes Putin’s narrative.
The West has introduced many sanctions against Putin and Russia to punish the war supporters. Yet can it do something to support the Russian anti-war movement?
No one knew how to react to the war. The sanctions imposed by the West on Russia had many negative consequences for Russians who opposed the war. Then they realized that Putin continues to sell oil and gas.
We’re sitting in this comfortable space here in Vienna, Austria. It’s very warm, and we know why. Austria is still using Russian gas. In November, I believe it set a record with 90 percent of all imported gas coming from Russia. Yet if a Russian tries to obtain an Austrian visa or even open a bank account here, they won’t be allowed.
This really frustrates people, especially anti-war, pro-Western Russians. They’re saying, “You imposed all these sanctions, but Putin still has money.”
Perhaps after that, the West should have paused and reconsidered. In the second year of the war, they imposed sanctions preventing Russians from entering the West with private cars. Meanwhile, there are record gas imports. So people say, “Putin’s gas is welcome, but Russians with cars are not?”
I see exiled politicians trying to explain and advocate for the sanctions, saying there was no other way to oppose Putin. But people point out inconsistencies. For example, banning crypto transactions: Binance left Russia, but I know many Russians who fled, including journalists, used Binance to transfer their rubles via crypto. Rich Russians and those in Putin’s circle don’t use Binance. They go to Moscow City with suitcases of cash, exchange it for cryptocurrency, and then get cash in Dubai. Everyone knows this.
My wife is an EU citizen, so I use her bank card. In Bulgaria, it was very difficult even to open a bank account. I’m labeled a “foreign agent” in Russia. I had to leave before the war because they were going to arrest me. At that time, I accepted it. But when it happens to more and more people, they start questioning – especially since Putin is still selling gas and oil.
Any signal from the West that they understand there are allies inside and outside Russia would help. No one’s asking for support – just for pro-European, pro-Western Russians to be heard.
The narrative Putin is instilling in people’s minds will persist for a long time. He’s stirring up dark elements from the collective unconscious, much like Trump is doing in the US. When Putin eventually leaves, we’ll face many problems with this narrative because a generation will have grown up with ideas that the West wants to conquer Russia and other such notions. Banning everything Russian while not fully banning Putin’s actions won’t help address this issue.
What gives you hope in these dark times?
We’ll have an election in March. Everyone knows Putin will run and receive about 80% of the vote. His real rating is probably around 45-50%, but using various tools like a three-day voting process and e-voting, they’ll inflate that 50% to 80%. There are no real alternative candidates; all the other candidates will be mere figureheads.
But I’ve started receiving many messages from people in Russia saying, “We should do something.” They can’t protest or discuss it openly at work for fear of being reported to the police for opposing the war.
Now we have a chance – or maybe just hope – that we can do something. Perhaps just go to the polling station and write “Fuck off, Putin” on the ballot before putting it in the box. We journalists in exile felt this wave of emotional hope from Russia.
And then something happened! A woman, a regional journalist from Rzhev, announced, “I’ll run in these elections.” At first, people were skeptical, but then more and more gathered around her to help. There was a meeting in Moscow because officially, at least 500 people need to say, “Yes, we want her as president” before she can submit documents to the central election committee.
This sparked a wave of emotions and criticism. Some say the Kremlin is behind her, or maybe Khodorkovsky, but that doesn’t really matter.
When these people came to the meeting in Moscow, despite all the danger – someone even cut the electricity – they were still there. It felt like when Navalny was running for election; the emotional wave was the same. Such things give me hope.
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Sources
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