We’ve grown accustomed to thinking that television is the main source of propaganda. However, in the world of digital media, TV hosts are not enough to control opinions. Propaganda has evolved alongside technology and actively embraced new platforms. How do propagandists use social media and adapt them to their purposes?
denkfabrik discussed this with Alesya Sokolova – a researcher at Cedar, data-journalist of “Novaya Gazeta Europe“, and author of the blog “Fake social researcher” (RU) – who has dedicated a series of studies to Russian propaganda.
In this post you will learn about four most common tactics Russian government uses to control public opinion in Russia.
Social media manipulation with bots
While television remains a propaganda tool, it’s no longer the sole focus. Russian propaganda now actively imitates public opinion through “astroturfing” – the practice of masking the sponsors of a message to make it appear as though it originates from grassroots participants. This tactic is used to promote government narratives in non-political social media groups and communities.
On popular social networks like VK (formerly VKontakte), propaganda efforts are both overt and covert. Manual and automated bots flood pro-government groups with supportive comments. These bots, often managed by “bot farm” employees working for the Kremlin, post aggressive content supporting the war and government policies.
Automated bots, powered by neural networks, are less common but still present. They’re recognizable by their unnatural writing style and tend to mention “United Russia” frequently.
Bots typically concentrate their efforts in pro-government VK groups rather than opposition-focused ones. Their primary goal isn’t to convince regime opponents but to reinforce an image of mass support. VK administrators often accommodate these pro-government bots, even going so far as to unban their accounts en masse.
Public Sector Coercion
The propaganda machine extends into the public sector. Government workers are often pressured to write identical pro-government posts en masse, creating an illusion of widespread support. This administrative mechanism is another tool used to imitate public backing for government policies.
Hidden Propaganda and Tailored Propaganda
Perhaps more insidious is the “hidden propaganda” disguised as entertainment content. Every eighth popular entertainment community on VK is involved in spreading tailored propaganda. These appear in seemingly innocuous groups like “I’m a pensioner,” “Academy of decent guys,” or “Dark humor.”
The content is carefully tailored to different demographics. For instance, pensioner-focused communities might share obituaries of fallen Russian soldiers, while teenage groups feature posts portraying Putin as an authoritative figure.
Influencer promotion
On Telegram, the propaganda strategy differs. Early in the conflict, aggressively patriotic narratives dominated, with state media amplifying pro-war military bloggers (or “milbloggers”). This symbiotic relationship was mutually beneficial: milbloggers increased their popularity tenfold, while the state reinforced the pro-war narratives.
Interestingly, milbloggers may act independently, but their actions often align with state interests, leading to government promotion. However, recent social surveys suggest that this “turbo-patriotic” rhetoric is becoming less appealing to Russians, and milblogger popularity is declining.
Propaganda effectiveness
While the efficiency of those tactics are hard to evaluate, there is some evidence that the propaganda narratives generate a genuine engagement of the elderly population, but fails to do so among the younger audiences. Whether it is due to better narrative creation among the elderly or due to internal preferences being revealed this way, is an open question.
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